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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:500
tamined in Jonathan Logan Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc.167 and
its progeny,168 judicial alternatives to automatic preclusion are indeed
welcomed.
CPLR 7503(c): Application to stay arbitration must be received within
ten days.
Inasmuch as the ten-day preclusionary caveat contained in CPLR
7503(c) has been construed as a statute of limitations, 69 there is a great
danger that the right to assert threshold objections to arbitration'70 may
be lost by the failure to act promptly. Hence, questions relating to
when the ten-day period begins to run'7 ' and how the requisite special
proceeding 72 is timely commenced 173 are of critical importance to the
practitioner. Unfortunately, the amount of litigation generated by this
section is disheartening. 7 4 The latest issue to become the focal point of
judicial controversy concerns a determination of the last date on which
a timely application for a stay of arbitration can be received by the
party demanding arbitration.
In Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Anness'76 the Supreme Court, New
York County, ruled that service of a notice of petition for a stay of ar-
bitration was effected on the date of mailing-not on the date of ac-
tual receipt. The court reasoned that a contrary holding would compel
a party to post his moving papers at least three days before the ten-day
period expired in order to insure timely receipt. And, the court rea-
167 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969).
168 See, e.g., Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 35 App. Div. 2d 21, 312 N.Y.S.2d 406
(1st Dep't 1970); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d
216, 303 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969) (parties are not permitted to ex-
tend the ten-day period by written agreement).
169 Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d
477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969).
170 See note 158, supra.
171 See Monarch Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 32 App. Div. 2d 819, 302 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't
1969); Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moliere, 31 App. Div. 2d 924, 298 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1st
Dep't 1969) (ten-day period begins to run when the notice of intention to arbitrate is
actually received).
172 CPLR 7502(a): "A special proceeding shall be used to bring before a court the
first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy which is not made by motion
in a pending action .. "
173 It has been held that the moving papers cannot be served on a party's attorney.
State-Wide Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d Dep't 1968). But
see Bauer v. MVAIC, 31 App. Div. 2d 239, 296 N.Y.S.2d 675 (4th Dep't 1969). And, it is
generally acknowledged that the three-day time extension under CPLR 2103(b) is in-
apposite. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 32 App. Div. 2d 819, 302 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't
1969).
174 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 7503(c), supp. commentary at 132 (1970).
175 62 Misc. 2d 592, 308 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 145, 173 (1970).
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
soned that if the ten-day period is indeed a statute of limitations, then
the movant should be afforded a full ten days in which to act.
In Knickerbocker Insurance Co. v. Gilbert17 6 the opposite position
was taken by the Appellate Division, First Department. A notice of in-
tention to arbitrate was served on December 1, 1969. On December 11,
petitioner posted by certified mail a notice of petition for a stay of ar-
bitration which was received on the following day. Service was deemed
untimely on the ground that the moving papers were not received
within ten days after service of the notice of intention to arbitrate.
The court compared the situation at hand to cases holding that the
ten-day period did not begin to run until the notice of intention to ar-
bitrate was actually received 177 and concluded that since the legislature
employed identical language in both parts of CPLR 7503(c) the con-
structions should be identical. In so doing, the court utilized cases
which attempted to afford the practitioner a full ten days in which to
act as a postulate for an outcome which drastically reduces the number
of days in which to act. But, practical considerations were of little im-
port to the court inasmuch as "[e]xpediency and convenience have no
place in determining questions of jurisdiction."'178
In view of the stringent constructions placed on CPLR 7503(c), 170
it is extremely unfortunate that the Knickerbocker court refused to
offer some relief to the belabored practitioner. It would have facilitated
greatly the processing of an application to stay arbitration if the First
Department had sanctioned a procedure whereby the attorney could
mail the moving papers on the tenth day and use the return receipt as
evidence that they were in fact mailed on that date. As the law stands
under Knickerbocker, the attorney must either mail his moving papers
at least three days before the expiration of the ten-day period or aban-
don the mailing provision altogether in favor of personal delivery.
NEw YoRK CITY CIVIL COURT Aar
CCA 404: Execution within New York City of contract to send child to
summer camp is not a transaction of business.
"CCA § 404 is CPLR § 302, tailored to fit the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court."'80 It follows, therefore, that case law arising under CPLR
176 35 App. Div. 2d 21, 312 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't 1970).
177 See cases cited note 171 supra.
178 35 App. Div. 2d at 21, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
179 See, e.g., Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898,
249 N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969); General Accident & Life Assurance Corp. v.
Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d 216, 303 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969).
180 29A MCKINNEY CCA, commentary at 103 (1963).
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